Democracy’s constituting of the people requires an inescapable moment of closure.

Evidence

It could, of course, be objected that this is a view of democracy which is at odds with the liberal-democratic one, and some would certainly claim thar this should be called not democracy but populism. To be sure, Schmitt is no democrat in the liberal understanding of the term, and he had nothing but contempt for the constraints imposed by liberal institutions on the democratic will of the people. But the issue he raises is a crucial one, even for those who advocate liberal-democratic forms. The logic of democracy does indeed imply a moment of closure which is required by the very process of constituting the ‘people’. This cannot be avoided, even in a liberal-democratic model; it can only be negotiated differently. But this in tum can be done only if this closure, and the paradox it implies, are acknowledged. … By stressing that the identity of a democratic political community hinges on the possibility of drawing a frontier betwccn ‘us’ and ‘them’, Schmitt highlights the fact that democracy always entails relations of inclusiolH:Xclusion. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 192

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s agonistic-pluralism test: here the ‘frontier us/them’ is presented as constitutive of the demos, the very construction of the in-group ‘we’—relevant to whether a non-exclusionary ‘we’ is conceivable. — connects to: Democracy’s defining trait is that no actor represents the whole — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 101; The incommensurability of universal and particular is the precondition for democracy — Stuart Hall, Essential Essays, Volume 2: Identity…, 378; Depression follows democracy’s lack of decisive closure — Byung-Chul Han, The Burnout Society, 118 (+1 more)

Broader Connections