Debunking legal concepts first requires a theory of how we actually use them

Evidence

Before we can decide that our concepts of law and of legal obligation are myths, we must decide what they are. We must be able to state, at least roughly, what it is we all believe that is wrong. But the nerve of our problem is that we have great difficulty in doing just that. Indeed, when we ask what law is and what legal obligations are, we are asking for a theory of how we use those concepts and of the conceptual commitments our use entails. We cannot conclude, before we have such a general theory, that our practices are stupid or superstitious. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 12

Categorization

• SEED: The move ‘before calling something a myth, state the theory of its use’ translates to any debunking genre — good essay scaffolding for questioning common intellectual takedowns.
• XREF: connects to: Legal nominalists treat law and obligation as myths to be discarded — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 11; Legal analogy requires a theoretical basis rather than mere perception — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 608; Concepts of law and legal obligation must stay until shown illusory — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 17 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Legal analogy requires a theoretical basis rather than mere perception #corroborates (0.80) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 608