de Gaulle’s self-determination offer came too late to save Algérie française

Evidence

In a world of such rapid change it was also unreal to suggest that four whole years would have to elapse between any cease-fire and the referendum deciding, on de Gaulle’s three options. Given the precedent of past bad experiences with French government promises for the future, from Blum—Viollette onwards, it was asking a lot of trust and confidence from the Algerian Muslims of all political hues. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe (as does Edward Behr) that “Had such an offer been made in the first three years of the rebellion, it is virtually certain that it would have been immediately accepted by the rebel leaders.” It is also no exaggeration to regard de Gaulle’s “self-determination” speech of 16 September 1959 as one of the most decisive events of the whole war. Here was a true watershed; nothing that went before was any longer relevant, and nothing could be the same again. There could no longer be any convincing prospect of Algérie française. The genie was out of the bottle; once the fateful word “self-determination” was spoken, it could never be corked up again. In retrospect this was also, perhaps, the last moment in the war when there was a possibility of a compromise peace by which the pieds noirs could have remained in their beloved homeland, one way or another. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1056

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘genie out of the bottle’ watershed logic parallels the irreversible moments of other decolonization crises; connects to the ‘Savage War of Peace’ concept’s central turning points. — connects to: De Gaulle relocated Algeria’s command to Rocher-Noir to escape ultra mobs, but too late.; De Gaulle’s slow pace in 1958 squandered momentum to the FLN — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 929; Challe’s loyalty to the republic collapsed only when de Gaulle shifted toward Algerian self-determination — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1344 (+2 more)
• SEED: The counterfactual — an earlier offer built on Blum-Viollette precedents would have been accepted — is a useful essay angle on the tragedy of missed diplomatic windows.

Related

• De Gaulle relocated Algeria’s command to Rocher-Noir to escape ultra mobs, but too late. (similarity 0.88)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle’s pursuit of national grandeur required sacrificing Algeria. (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle’s true intentions on Algeria remain a fundamentally contested riddle. (similarity 0.84)
• Challe’s loyalty to the republic collapsed only when de Gaulle shifted toward Algerian self-determination (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle’s slow pace in 1958 squandered momentum to the FLN (similarity 0.83)
• Junior officers saw Algerian independence immediately in de Gaulle’s self-determination speech (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle hid his Algerian self-determination policy because public opinion was unready (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s allies saw Algeria as subordinate to the French state’s crisis (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s pursuit of national grandeur dictated abandoning Algeria (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s political delays gave the F.L.N. a vital respite before Challe (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s decolonisation rhetoric was the final trigger for Challe’s decision. (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s Algerian independence was framed as a victory over French self (similarity 0.82)
• Gaulle hid his Algeria intentions to avoid capsizing French public opinion. (similarity 0.81)
• Algeria was only one element of de Gaulle’s larger ambitions. (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Franco-Algerian coexistence was destroyed by accumulated missed chances #expands (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1611
• De Gaulle’s political successes could not translate into any Algerian peace progress #corroborates (0.65) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 957
• Challe’s loyalty to the republic collapsed only when de Gaulle shifted toward Algerian self-determination #complicates (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1344