Courts should rarely infer legislators intended to freeze a decision’s rule

Evidence

Notice that attitudes (9) through (11) are actually extremely subtle ones. They presuppose approval of the naked rules of decisions, irrespective of the soundness of their reasoning. The presuppose disapproval of any subsequent departure from those rules, irrespective of the persuasiveness of the judicial considerations counseling such departure. Conceived as the Court conceived of them in Toolson and its successors, they presuppose a deliberate purpose to perpetuate irrational discrepancies in the law. … How ready should a court be to attribute such an attitude to a legislator, let alone to a majority of the legislators? … How likely is it, in actuality, that any legislator would have such an attitude? That he would ever pose the problem in this way to hi-iself in the first place? That, if so, he would know enough about stare decisis and its liimitations to be able to pose the problem accurately, and understand what he was deciding? — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3351

Categorization

• XREF: Undercuts the inference-of-adoption doctrine of ch44 by probing the empirical implausibility of the legislator psychology it presupposes. — connects to: When a statute addresses judges, its meaning can be reshaped both ways — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3322; Legislative-inaction doctrine would freeze all judicial creativity if extended — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3357; Congressional inaction following judicial construction can count as adoption of that construction — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3273 (+8 more)

Broader Connections

• Formalism disguises the need for judicial choice by freezing rule meaning #complicates (0.78) — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 370
• Common law judges may only decide the case before them #qualifies (0.75) — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 227
• Courts must decide only the case before them, not hypothetical future cases #qualifies (0.75) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 1008
• Courts construe legislative silence as deliberate intent, though silence admits other readings #expands (0.72) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 4205