Absence of unfair surprise never justifies overruling precedent alone

Evidence

Consider the utility, in the analysis of problems of this kind, of testing always the strength of the reasons advanced Jn favor of a novel ground of decisiontefore turning to examine the weight of the considerations which counsel against innovation. The mere fact that no one could claim unfair surprise if an old case were overruled is never in itself a sufficient reason for overruling it, is it? — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 2563

Categorization

• DEFINE: Articulates the analytic order in stare-decisis reasoning: affirmative reasons for overruling must be tested before weighing reasons against innovation.
• XREF: Reinforces ch36’s account of precedent philosophy and the separation of stability from progress in judicial lawmaking. — connects to: Lay reliance on assumed outcomes should outweigh lawyers’ technical reliance on precedent — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 2384; Overruling precedent is never an absolute good but a choice between relative evils — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1240; Courts should not adjudicate malapportionment despite admitting its unfairness — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3674 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Overruling precedent is never an absolute good but a choice between relative evils #expands (0.85) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1240
• Respect for precedent keeps courts from reversing failed policies. #corroborates (0.82) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1482
• Courts should not adjudicate malapportionment despite admitting its unfairness #exemplifies (0.80) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3674
• Stated precedent rules often fail to determine later case outcomes #complicates (0.80) — Burton, Steven J, An Introduction to Law and Legal…, 216
• Courts should rarely infer legislators intended to freeze a decision’s rule #expands (0.75) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3351
• Precedent expresses a universal human need for predictability, not a common-law peculiarity #expands (0.75) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 4854