Courts construe legislative silence as deliberate intent, though silence admits other readings

Evidence

The Libten court held that the absence of a provision in the Civil Aeronautics Act similar to the Carmack Amendment “compels the conclusion” that the statute does not forbid an airline’s eliminating liability for loss of jewelry. Here we have another instance of a court construing legislative silence by saying in effect, “If that’s what they meant, why didn’t they say so?” Is this sound? Is not congressional silence at least equally consistent with the view that the common law limitations on carriers’ power would continue? — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 4205

Categorization

• XREF: Builds on the earlier chapter’s ‘omission of a known exception signals deliberate intent’ principle and now pushes against it. — connects to: A legislature’s omission of a known exception signals deliberate intent to exclude it — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1872; Legislative inaction is itself a distinct technique of control — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 728; A penal statute’s silence on a subject implies no legislative intent to regulate it — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1005 (+3 more)
• DEFINE: Names the interpretive move ‘construing legislative silence’ in its strongest criticized form.

Broader Connections

• Courts decide statutory meaning where legislative intent is genuinely ambiguous #expands (0.90) — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 490