Courts judged racism by explicit racial language, not inequitable outcomes

Evidence

But the bill was limited in that it did not target private, local, or race-veiled laws of racial discrimination. Discriminatory racial language (not racial inequities) became the proof of racism for the federal courts—the apparatus charged with the huge burden of enforcing equal treatment. It was like writing laws for premeditated murders and not writing manslaughter laws for murders that the state could not prove were premeditated. The shrewdest discriminators switched tactics, and simply avoided using racial language to veil their discriminatory intent, to get away with racial murder. — Ibram X. Kendi, Stamped from the Beginning, 639

Categorization

• XREF: Directly anticipates the post-civil-rights critique of facially neutral laws — connects to later chapters on colorblindness and to Bonilla-Silva’s colorblind racism. — connects to: Racism in country music culture operates through use, not lyrics — Nina Eliasoph, Avoiding politics: how Americans…, 905; Courts dismiss anti-Muslim harassment as stray remarks excused as ignorance or protected political speech — Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the Words That Hurt:…, 427; Colorblind national-security pretexts let courts uphold racial bans they reject elsewhere — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of…, 640 (+2 more)
• QUESTION: Does this explain a through-line: legal definitions of racism hinging on intent (‘specific intent’) rather than disparate impact, still true in 14th Amendment jurisprudence?
• DEFINE: Operational definition of racism as intentional language use vs. structural outcome — an early form of the antiracist’s objection that racism is effect, not intent.