Statutes serve courts as analogies and points of departure, not controlling rules

Evidence

It is axiomatic that the rules of law stated in the hornbooks are of limited utility in litigated cases, because the cases customarily do not fall into the neat factual patterns to which the rules have been attached. Combinations of facts bring with them combinations of rules, each with its claim to be recognized as ‘the governing principle;’ here, the courts are forced to make not an automatic decision based on the rule, but a decision based on conflicting rules. The reasons for the rules are to be studied, the consequences of applying one rather than the other are to be evaluated. The effects of the decision on subsequent cases are to be considered. The clear cases (that is, the cases which unquestionably fall within the rule) are used as analogies, with which are compared the complex cases (which unquestionably do not fall with the rule as it has theretofore been stated and applied). Now, where statutes supplant the rules as developed by the courts, the judicial process need undergo no essential change; the only alteration should be in the materials that are to be employed as the basis of deliberation. Instead of precedent and case-law analogies, the statutes are available, 5 Let it be realized, however, that they are only points of departure, only analogies, though exceptionally informative and persuasive and illuninating analogies; to regard the statutory suggestions as controlling every case which bears some re- semblance or relation to the stuff of the statute, would be to fetter this branch of judicial work with the same rusty chains of conceptualism that have so long impeded the growth of decisional law. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1398

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the treatise’s core method: treating statutes as persuasive analogies rather than imperatives in interstitial adjudication.
• XREF: Direct line to ch0-1 material on adjudicative lawmaking and how courts handle statutes as byproducts of deciding cases; also echoes the volume’s recurring conceptualism critique. — connects to: Courts should consult legislative policy signals even outside the jurisdiction to void contracts — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1400; Courts can include new subjects under old statutes despite absent legislative intent — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1406; Courts should attribute purpose to statutes and interpret words to serve it — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3499 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Courts follow canons of construction as guidelines, not binding rules #corroborates (0.95) — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 498
• Respect for precedent keeps courts from reversing failed policies. #complicates (0.75) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1482