A settled statutory interpretation binds later courts like law, not dictum.

Evidence

Therefore it seems better to say that once a decisive interpretation of legislative intent has been made, and in that sense a direction has been fixed within the gap of ambiguity, the court should take that direction as given. In this sense a court’s interpretation of legislation is not dictum. The words it uses do more than to decide the case. They give broad direction to the statute. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3173

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines why a court’s statutory interpretation is ‘not dictum’ — fixing direction within the gap of ambiguity.
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: this reverses the normal dictum-vs-holding boundary in a distinctive way tied to statutes.
• XREF: connects to: Stare decisis scope depends on whether Congress legislates general ideas or specific applications. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3093; Prior interpretations can foreclose renewed inquiry into a statute’s basic purpose — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3193; Congressional inaction following judicial construction can count as adoption of that construction — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3273 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• A binding precedent obliges courts to follow it or distinguish it. #expands (0.85) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 102
• Long-accepted administrative or popular constructions can fix statutory meaning. #qualifies (0.75) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3558