Scientific truth rests on a dialectical proof rule and a metaphysical non-deception rule
Evidence
The scientific solution of this difficulty consists in the observance of two rules. The first of these is dialectical or even rhetorical in the forensic sense: a referent is that which is susceptible to proof and can be used as evidence in a debate. Not: I can prove something because reality is the way I say it is. But: as long as I can produce proof, it is permissible to think that reality is the way I say it is. The second rule is metaphysical; the same referent cannot supply a plurality of contradictory or inconsistent proofs. Or stated differently: “God” is not deceptive. — Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 216
Categorization
- DEFINE: Defines the two rules (dialectical and metaphysical) that resolve the science knowledge legitimation difficulty.
- XREF: The ‘God is not deceptive’ premise is a metanarrative in miniature — the exact thing Jameson reads Lyotard as declaring incredulous toward. — connects to: Consensus-based truth theories cannot justify specific assertions — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist…, 434; Metaphysical propositions gain truth-value as technology makes them physically realizable — Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the…, 808; Secondary codification of truth through dialectic remains structurally unclarified — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 644 (+3 more)
Broader Connections
- Secondary codification of truth through dialectic remains structurally unclarified
#expands(0.85) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 644 - Denying metaphysics in favor of science is itself a metaphysical position
#expands(0.80) — Wael Hallaq, Restating Orientalism, 294 - Self-deception requires precise knowledge of the truth being concealed, not ignorance
#expands(0.75) — Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain_ Epistemic…, 1397 - Said’s anti-positivism secretly depends on positivist truth criteria
#exemplifies(0.72) — Wael Hallaq, Restating Orientalism, 629