Early Sartre held that consciousness is never self-identical.
Evidence
For the early Sartre, as he makes clear many times in Being and Nothingness, consciousness is never self-identical; its being is not to be what it is. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 249
Categorization
- DEFINE: States the core Sartrean thesis on consciousness that differentiates him from Hegelian Geist.
- XREF: connects to: Consciousness’s temporality refuses the instant because the for-itself never is. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 501; Consciousness of self is identical with consciousness of the object, not a separate act — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 134; One is never identical with any of one’s own attitudes or actions — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 300 (+1 more)
Broader Connections
- Consciousness’s temporality refuses the instant because the for-itself never is.
#expands(0.90) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 501 - One is never identical with any of one’s own attitudes or actions
#expands(0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 300 - Consciousness of self is identical with consciousness of the object, not a separate act
#contradicts(0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 134 - Identity is perpetually in formation, never a completed essence.
#exemplifies(0.70) — Stuart Hall, Essential Essays, Volume 2, 203