Common-pool resources are governed as bundles of separable property rights.

Evidence

Second, common-pool resources are not open-access resources but common-property regimes “in which a group of resource owners shared rights and duties towards a resource” (McKean 2000, p. 30). Common-property regimes include a “bundle of rights” (Schlager and Ostrom 1992): the right to access a property; to extract certain units of a given resource (e.g., fish); to manage or regulate internal use patterns; to exclude/determine who has access; and to alienate (e.g., sell or lease the exclusion). Common-property regimes adopt different combinations of the five rights depending on the culture and country. — Laura Albareda and Alejo Jose G. Sison, Commons Organizing, 62

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Clarifies the Schlager-Ostrom five-rights bundle that distinguishes common-property from open-access regimes.
  • XREF: The alienability and access-rights distinctions echo the ‘Grafting & Growth’ article’s treatment of who controls living infrastructure like root bridges or trees. — connects to: Commons function as social resources binding communities together, not just property rights. — Emil Sandström and Ann-Kristin Ekman and Karl-Johan Lindholm, Commoning in the periphery – The role…, 10; Cooperatives reproduce themselves through shared governance and yield both material and immaterial common resources. — Jessica Carrick-Hagenbarth, Institutional Bricolage and Commoning…, 14; Excessive property rights can block beneficial use rather than enable it — , The Braided Reading EPUB: 5-Year…, 2284
  • corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim — Laura Albareda and Alejo Jose G. Sison, Commons Organizing: Embedding Common…, 62

Broader Connections