Commitments are often manufactured by removing one’s own control over action

Evidence

Some trucks carry signs that say, “Alarm and lock system not subject to the driver’s control.” The time lock on bank vaults serves much the same purpose, as does the mandatory secret ballot in elections. So does starting an invasion with a small advance force that, though too small and premature to win the objective, attaches too much “face” to the enterprise to permit withdrawal: the larger force can then be readied without fear of inviting a purely deterrent threat. At many universities the faculty is protected by a rule that denies instructors the power to change a course grade once it has been recorded. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 714

Categorization

• XREF: The mandatory secret ballot and no-erasure traffic tickets are institutional hostage mechanics — supporting the reader’s claim that the Don uses self-disabling devices to make commitments credible. — connects to: Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 433; Commitment includes removing options, delegating fulfilment, and self-handicapping — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 300; An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 345 (+10 more)

Related

• Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. (similarity 0.85)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.83)
• Commitment includes removing options, delegating fulfilment, and self-handicapping (similarity 0.83)
• An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Commitment includes removing options, delegating fulfilment, and self-handicapping #expands (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 300
• An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply #exemplifies (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 345
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance #exemplifies (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 317
• Stating a reason creates a presumptive commitment to follow it later #expands (0.70) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 325