Chimpanzees outperform humans at strategic randomization in competitive games

Evidence

The performance of the apes in this setup was no fluke. The Caltech-Kyoto team also ran two other versions of the game, each with different payoffs. In both versions, the chimps zeroed in on the Nash equilibrium as it moved around from game to game. This means that chimps can develop what game theorists call a mixed strategy , which requires them to randomize their behavior around a certain probability. Humans, however, often struggle with this. — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success, 99

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s framework on which cognitive capacities humans delegate to culture versus retain individually. — connects to: Humans can be trained to match chimpanzee working-memory accuracy. — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture…, 91; Asymmetric payoffs in strategic games can be tested with chimps and humans — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture…, 96; Human pattern-seeking is designed for cooperation, not for randomness — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 742 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Human slowness in these games reflects effortful inhibition of automatic imitation #corroborates (0.85) — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success, 100
• Human pattern-seeking is designed for cooperation, not for randomness #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 742
• A randomized minimax strategy deliberately destroys all communication between players #complicates (0.76) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 250
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games #qualifies (0.74) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 367