Challe’s loyalty to the republic collapsed only when de Gaulle shifted toward Algerian self-determination

Evidence

Back in 1958, at the time of confusion preceding de Gaulle’s takeover, Challe had seemed the embodiment of the ideal republican general, leaning if anything towards the Socialists. To his friend Guy Mollet he had remarked, “If this business goes on any longer, only de Gaulle will be capable of putting things back into order,” concluding emphatically: “For my part, I will never fire on my comrades in arms.” The series of disillusions that he had suffered as de Gaulle’s Commander-in-Chief in Algeria have already been amply traced; then had come the President’s “Algérie algérienne” speech of 4 November 1960, while Challe was commanding N.A.T.O.’s Central Europe theatre at Fontainebleau. Switching off the television, he confided to his diary: “From this moment I shall begin to think deeply about the sense of my remaining in the army.” Feeling increasingly a sense of futility at Fontainebleau, on 30 December Challe had offered his resignation. In giving his reasons to Debré, Challe had condemned the prospect of any Algerian government being formed by the G.P.R.A. — which was where he felt de Gaulle’s policy was leading. This would inevitably result in a “blood bath” and his conscience would not permit him to remain in the army. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1344

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the book’s broader theme of how de Gaulle’s Algerian policy drove his own loyalist generals to mutiny, echoing earlier chapters on May 1958. — connects to: Sakiet’s fallout made the Algerian army feel betrayed by Paris.; Dissident colonels threatened to replace de Gaulle with Challe.; de Gaulle’s self-determination offer came too late to save Algérie française — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1056 (+7 more)

Related

• Dissident colonels threatened to replace de Gaulle with Challe. (similarity 0.92)
• Challe aimed to change Gaullist policy, not remove de Gaulle (similarity 0.91)
• The Algerian army command openly threatened to replace de Gaulle over self-determination. (similarity 0.89)
• Sakiet’s fallout made the Algerian army feel betrayed by Paris. (similarity 0.87)
• De Gaulle and Challe gave conflicting accounts of the self-determination private briefing. (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle’s decolonisation rhetoric was the final trigger for Challe’s decision. (similarity 0.85)
• Call of honour above pied-noir loyalty drove Challe’s doomed revolt (similarity 0.84)
• Challe confined the coup to Algeria to keep fighting the ALN (similarity 0.84)
• Challe’s focus on battlefield offensives blinded him to his colonels’ plotting (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle’s Algeria offensive aimed partly to distract the army from politics (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.83)
• de Gaulle’s self-determination offer came too late to save Algérie française (similarity 0.83)
• Challe came to believe de Gaulle had encouraged him to perjure himself (similarity 0.83)
• Algeria’s military ultimatum pressured a French president into inviting de Gaulle. (similarity 0.83)
• Junior officers saw Algerian independence immediately in de Gaulle’s self-determination speech (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• De Gaulle sought army success to reconcile it to Algerian independence #corroborates (0.40) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1002
• De Gaulle’s Algerian Republic speech ruptured the francisation triptych and his allies #qualifies (0.35) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1287