Categorization distorts perception and memory by increasing within-group confusion

Evidence

Whereas Tajfel and Wilkes provided evidence that categorization leads perceivers to overestimate the difference between groups, later work con- firmed that categorization also reduces the perceived variability within categories. For instance, stimuli belonging to the same category are more perceptually confusable than are cross-category stimuli (Harnad, 1987). This effect is consistent with Allport’s claim that “categories assimilate as much old and new experience as possible to themselves” (1954/1979, p. 170). Beyond the implications of categorization for perception and judgment, Allport also noted that the categorization process implies a comparison between an old and an incoming representation. Categorization therefore involves a memory component. A straightforward illustration of the biasing impact of categorization on memory can be found in the “who-said-what” paradigm: people are more likely to misremember face–statement associations within than between groups (e.g., Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). For instance, individuals are more likely to misattribute a statement by a female speaker to another female than to another male speaker. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1156

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Tajfel’s minimal group paradigm work and Harnad’s perceptual categorization literature; also offers an empirical anchor for the ‘assimilation’ dynamic of stereotypes broadly. — connects to: Human memory stores concepts as associative networks of linked nodes — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof: Why Misinformation Infects…, 972
• SEED: The who-said-what misattribution effect is a vivid, quotable experiment — a possible angle: how source memory failures (‘I’m sure she said that’) silently manufacture group homogeneity in daily life.