Buber’s ungrounded trust inverts ordinary judgment that grounds justify trust.

Evidence

Recall Buber’s (1951, 7) supposition that I trust someone “without being able to offer sufficient reasons for my trust in him.” Note how peculiar this would be in a real-world relationship. When I first meet you, perhaps I take risks merely optimistically or out of hope. For Buber this could be genuine trust, because it has no grounds, at least no grounds in you. Ten years later, when I have great experience of your trustworthiness, I genuinely do trust you. This would not be trust for Buber, however, because it is based on sufficient reasons. Buber insists that trust is, in the end, ungrounded. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 361

Categorization

• XREF: Buber’s insistence that reasons disqualify trust directly contradicts Hardin’s own encapsulated-interest account — the counterpoint sharpens the reader’s central theoretical contrast.
• DEFINE: Clarifies what Buber means by trust (noncognitive, ineffable, ungrounded) versus what Hardin means (grounded in the other’s incentives).