Offering explicit reasons undermines rather than strengthens trust

Evidence

The way in which symbolic controls operate, moreover, tends characteristically to be unquestioned and indeterminate. It proceeds for the most part by inferences which remain uncommunicated and which therefore do not even need to be defined or properly justified. This is why a very precise articulation of reasons and views is not in keeping with either the demonstration of trust or the withdrawal of trust. Even for those who seek trust, it is not required; it can quite easily even become a disrupting factor or, even more, may arouse distrust. It would contradict the function and style of trust to request and offer detailed factual information and specialized arguments, although the possibility of such an explanation ought to be hinted at. The expert can become a threat to the politician and his reasons when he takes to arguing along those same lines. The more reasons the politician can offer, the less need there is to trust him and the less it will matter who puts the programme into effect. Alternatively, if the question of trust is still relevant, the massing of reasons betrays an uncertainty which can lead to the withdrawal of trust. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 164

Categorization

• XREF: Directly supports the reader’s Ishiguro thesis: Stevens never asks for ‘detailed factual information’ — his deference depends precisely on symbolic, unquestioned control. Also parallels Giddens on how laypersons avoid interrogating expert systems.
• DEFINE: Clarifies what Luhmann means by ‘symbolic control’ operating through uncommunicated inference.