Bourses move reputational information as efficiently as goods

Evidence

The bourse is an information exchange as much as it is a commodities exchange. As one author put it, “the bourse grapevine is the best in the world. It has been going for years and moves with the efficiency of a satellite communications network… .Bourses are the fountainhead of this information and from them it is passed out along the tentacles that stretch around the world.” 9 The bourse facilitates the transmission of information about dealers’ reputations ° and, at least with respect to members, serves both a reputation-signaling and a reputation-monitoring function. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 49

Categorization

• XREF: Reputation-signaling and reputation-monitoring is the exact reputational machinery that, per the reading purpose, turns Coleman’s third-party mechanism into a force against the state — the dense network collates everyone’s standing. — connects to: Group reputation for fair dealing drives a trading bourse’s economic viability.; Intermediaries reduce reputational information costs in extralegal markets. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 133; Extralegal reputation-based contracting can work in large markets when information flows cheaply. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 178 (+6 more)

Related

• Intermediaries reduce reputational information costs in extralegal markets. (similarity 0.84)
• Extralegal reputation-based contracting can work in large markets when information flows cheaply. (similarity 0.84)
• An institution’s viability rests on the aggregate reputation of its members. (similarity 0.82)
• Private legal systems can rival state law when reputation functions as enforcement. (similarity 0.82)
• Group reputation for fair dealing drives a trading bourse’s economic viability. (similarity 0.82)
• Reputation systems need cheap information flow, not frequent repeated trade, to enforce honesty. (similarity 0.81)
• Trustworthiness cannot be communicated as objective market information. (similarity 0.80)
• Reputation enforcement works even without formal arbitration because traders seek future club membership. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Group reputation for fair dealing drives a trading bourse’s economic viability. #expands (0.85)
• Intermediaries reduce reputational information costs in extralegal markets. #expands (0.80) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 133
• Extralegal reputation-based contracting can work in large markets when information flows cheaply. #expands (0.75) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 178
• Reputation substitutes for formal enforcement in private trading clubs #exemplifies (0.75) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 43
• Trust-based reciprocal favors operate like financial capital #expands (0.72) — Coleman, SocialCapitalCreation-1988, 82
• Reputation systems need cheap information flow, not frequent repeated trade, to enforce honesty. #expands (0.70) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 13