Beliefs that groups have essences arise from categorizing lazily

Evidence

Because, by definition, people are experts in different and limited domains, a logical consequence of Allport’s view is that most social concepts are underdifferentiated. Accordingly, Allport noted that: “One consequence of least effort in group categorizing is that a belief in essence develops.” (1954/1979, p. 173-4). This subjective essentialism argument, i.e., the view that people tend to overestimate the homogeneity, consistency, and durability of social categories, has become a lively topic of research in recent intergroup relations work (for a collection, see Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004). — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1160

Categorization

Category: Causal Relationships

• DEFINE: Defines ‘subjective essentialism’ — the tendency to overestimate homogeneity, consistency, and durability of social categories.
• XREF: Connects to medin & Ortony’s psychological essentialism and Gelman’s work on essentialist beliefs in children.

Related

• Cognitive laziness in categorization generates belief in group essences (similarity 0.97)
• Essentialism serves to rationalize and justify rather than reflect group differences. (similarity 0.85)
• Group essence theories differ from similarity-based entitativity by treating groups as natural kinds (similarity 0.84)
• Group segregation breeds glib generalizations that go uncontradicted (similarity 0.83)
• Categorization renders outgroups more homogeneous and ingroups more varied (similarity 0.83)
• Essentialist notions of group difference get appropriated by elites to sustain domination. (similarity 0.82)
• Perceiving groups as natural kinds with essences drives sweeping stereotype generalization (similarity 0.81)
• Ethnocentric biases arise even from trivial or random group assignments (similarity 0.81)
• People apply distinct essence and agency theories when perceiving group entitativity (similarity 0.80)
• Multiple in-group categories can be cognitively represented in simplified or complex ways (similarity 0.79)
• Essentialist stereotypes justify unequal resource distribution rather than reflecting real differences (similarity 0.79)
• People treat group members as interchangeable to reduce cognitive effort. (similarity 0.78)
• People perceive groupness either through stable shared traits or through goal-driven process (similarity 0.78)
• Group membership salience shifts flexibly across contexts and individuals (similarity 0.78)
• Salient categorization during intergroup contact can breed anxiety rather than reduce prejudice. (similarity 0.78)