Beauvoir holds Others as essential, challenging Sartre’s ontological individualism

Evidence

Beauvoir, however, argues later in Th e Ethics of Ambiguity, “I concern others and they concern me. Th ere we have an irreducible truth. Th e me-others relationship is as indissoluble as the subject-object relationship” (EA, 72; MA, 104). So understood, Beauvoir comes to see Others as essential and not merely factually necessary. Contrary to Sartre’s ontological individualism, Beauvoir argues for an intrinsic ontological interdependence. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 184

Categorization

• XREF: Directly echoes the book’s central riddle of influence — Beauvoir’s Ethics of Ambiguity as a response to and advance over Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. — connects to: The existence of Others is a contingent primary event, not derivable from the for-itself; Beauvoir viewed her work and Sartre’s as one combined intellectual enterprise — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 50; Beauvoir studies contests her subordination to Sartre as a mere follower — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 44 (+15 more)

Broader Connections

• Beauvoir’s ontological freedom position may not depart significantly from Sartre’s #complicates (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 212
• Exclusionary practices against Others inflict harm by altering people’s social worth #expands (0.75) — Cristian Tileagă, The Nature of Prejudice, 71