Assuming officials are inherently corrupt may itself breed the corruption it seeks to prevent.

Evidence

With respect to the former, republicans typically reject the view (common in the liberal tradition) that public officials are by nature corrupt, and instead regard individuals as potentially corruptible, but not necessarily corrupt (Pettit 1997). Working from this assumption, it is strictly a pragmatic and empirical question which configurations of public laws, institutions, and norms are most likely to minimize the danger of corruption, and enhance the civic virtue of public officials. … In designing such institutions, it is important not to assume the worst of people, for otherwise we might inadvertently encourage (through an evident lack of trust) the very corrupt behavior one aims to guard against. — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 63

Categorization

• XREF: Parallels the self-fulfilling-prophecy logic familiar from sociology (labeling theory) and from institutional design debates; echoes distrust-driven governance critiques. — connects to: Expectation of corruption can produce more corruption on its own. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 1010; Distrust-based institutional design can actively corrupt honest officials. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 950; Institutions designed for worst-case knaves may actively corrupt virtuous people. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 950 (+5 more)
• DEFINE: Sharply distinguishes the republican assumption (corruptibility without necessary corruption) from the liberal assumption of natural corruption in officials.
• corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 63

Related

• Distrust-based institutional design can actively corrupt honest officials. (similarity 0.89)
• Institutions designed for worst-case knaves may actively corrupt virtuous people. (similarity 0.89)
• Republicanism distrusts the powerful, not the ordinary people, who need restraint. (similarity 0.79)
• Expectation of corruption can produce more corruption on its own. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Expectation of corruption can produce more corruption on its own. #corroborates (1.00) — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 1010
• Distrust-based institutional design can actively corrupt honest officials. #expands (0.95) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 950
• Institutions designed for worst-case knaves may actively corrupt virtuous people. #expands (0.93) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 950
• Self-enforcing constraints can induce honest behavior from dishonest actors. #corroborates (0.85)
• Citizen suspicion of government can trigger government suspicion of citizens. #exemplifies (0.80) — Anna Merlan, Republic of Lies, 959
• Social systems can be structured to institutionalize self-deception among officials #expands (0.75) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 705
• Trust is a byproduct of institutional enforcement and expected incentives. #corroborates (0.72) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 402