Trust is a byproduct of institutional enforcement and expected incentives.

Evidence

Trustworthiness as a Commodity Dasgupta argues that trust is a commodity, something that can be produced if there is adequate demand. In this claim, clearly he is concerned directly with trustworthiness and only indirectly with trust. He treats the general issue as an analog of the business firm’s problem of generating a reputation for trustworthiness. In such an analysis, of course, we must look at costs and benefits that give people incentive to be trustworthy. Typically, we might expect that we must have enforcement and punishment that is credible. My trust in you will be a function of my confidence in institutional enforcement. You trust persons (or agencies) to do something only if you expect them to choose to do it (Dasgupta 1988, 50–51, 60). Hence, Dasgupta says, you must think of the trusted’s position and likely incentives at the time of the need for fulfillment. Dasgupta’s view is in the class of expectations theories of trust; it is an incentiveto-be-trustworthy theory. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 402

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the expectations/incentive-to-be-trustworthy class of trust theories, anchored to Dasgupta.
• XREF: Directly connectable to Milgrom’s law-merchant analysis, where credible enforcement and private judges generate trust through incentives. — connects to: Assuming officials are inherently corrupt may itself breed the corruption it seeks to prevent. — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 63