Arbitration’s secrecy lets wrongdoers minimize reputation costs while right-holders gain speed and cheapness.

Evidence

First, if the nonmember knows he is in the wrong, yet the parties are unable to agree on a settlement, then having a neutral third party assess a penalty should enable him to minimize the reputation cost of his breach since arbitration awards are kept secret if the judgment is paid promptly. Although the arbitration’s results sometimes become known through gossip, as long as the individual is not frequently involved in such controversies, the damage to his reputation is likely to be contained. Second, if the nonmember thinks he is in the right, arbitration is preferable to litigation because it is cheaper, faster, and subjects the member to unqiue pressures to pay promptly. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 81

Categorization

  • QUESTION: The secrecy-dependent reputation logic suggests an interesting model: punishments that are hidden preserve social standing — worth comparing to shaming sanctions research and to how confidentiality clauses in settlements work.
  • XREF: connects to: Private arbitration can effectively substitute for courts — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 40; Private arbitration systems resolve disputes without public accountability.; Secrecy is the key reason dealers prefer arbitration over courts. (+10 more)

Broader Connections