Analogizing group experiences can illuminate shared mechanisms while disclaiming moral equivalence.

Evidence

Self-investment refers to feelings of a close psychological bond between the self and the group and the importance of the group to the self (three components fall along this dimension: in-group solidarity, in-group satisfaction, in-group centrality). In contrast, self-definition refers to perceptions of in-group similarity and prototypicality (two components: self-stereotyping, in-group homogeneity). We expect that self-investment (i.e. affective group attachment & group commitment; “hot” components of identification) but not self-definition (i.e. perceptions of mere group membership) should be associated non-linearly with collective guilt. — Torsten Masson and Markus Barth, The identification-guilt paradox…, 26 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: A matched-pair experimental design can isolate moral principles from ingroup bias. — Bob Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Specter, 1519; Merely priming in-group membership may trigger morality principle shifts without moral content — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2140; Highly identified group members minimize collective guilt by morally reinterpreting ingroup wrongs — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 2278 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Affective group attachment, not mere membership perception, drives non-linear responses to collective guilt #complicates (0.73) — Torsten Masson and Markus Barth, The identification-guilt paradox…, 26