Amendment-by-implication doctrine can ratify an agency’s contested interpretation when Congress touches a statute

Evidence

On the other hand, there are Supreme Court cases which suggest that if Congress reenacts a statutory provision or what is tantamount to doing that, merely changes part of it and reenacts the rest, they might be sid to have confirmed the existing asserted administrative interpretation. … Now, that is an established doctrine. What we are saying to you, sir, is, please be meticulously careful in making this slight change in 704 not to confirm the Food and Drug erroneous assertion. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 509

Categorization

• DEFINE: Names the reenactment/amendment-implies-confirmation doctrine and explains why a party facing a slight statutory change fears implicit ratification of an agency’s broad reading.
• XREF: Canon-of-construction doctrine for law course; parallels the Cardiff case reference in the book_so_far series about agencies avoiding effective power. — connects to: Conflicting statutory provisions can criminalize the very act the law says may be withheld — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 404; A written-notice requirement serves both a fourth amendment analogue and a record-keeping function — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 477; Reading a statute’s specific procedure as exclusive prohibition is a contested interpretive choice — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 2957 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Congressional inaction following judicial construction can count as adoption of that construction #expands (0.80) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3273
• Courts may not amend a statute however desirable policy change may be #complicates (0.75) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1059
• Reading meaning into statutes corrupts once legislation becomes an available remedy #contradicts (0.75) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1975
• Reading a statute’s specific procedure as exclusive prohibition is a contested interpretive choice #qualifies (0.72) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 2957
• Unconstitutional presidential acts can escape judicial review when Congress later ratifies them #exemplifies (0.72) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 2839