Congressional inaction following judicial construction can count as adoption of that construction

Evidence

Since this Court in three -onaidered eriAr sqdad ae rejected the construction of the statute for which the diAnntning Justioes.con- +4i000W the question which for me is decisive of the present case, ,1s hPther ngraes~has-likewge - rejected-that -cnsrinction by-it&e&bsequenttegislativp action, and has adopted and confirmed the Court’s earlier construction o. -I-t ngressionalacion taken with respect to proposals for amendment of the naturalization la ws since the decision in the Schwimmer case, leads me to concinderi +bAt-eongeah asuadopted and confi thatsed’nthn h -damrl-h c dmnt oul h raima laws The construction of the naturalization statutes, adopted by this Court in the three cases mentioned, immediately became the target of an active, publicized legislative attack in Congress which persisted for a period of eleven years, until the adoption of the Nationality Act in 1940. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3273

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: A settled statutory interpretation binds later courts like law, not dictum. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3173; Legislative-inaction doctrine would freeze all judicial creativity if extended — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3357; Courts should rarely infer legislators intended to freeze a decision’s rule — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3351 (+7 more)

Broader Connections