Bundling an extortionate demand onto a legitimate agenda makes the threat effective

Evidence

When there are two objects to negotiate, the decision to negotiate them simultaneously or in separate forums or at separate times is by no means neutral to the outcome, particularly when there is a latent extortionate threat that can be exploited only if it can be attached to some more ordinary, legitimate, bargaining situation. The protection against extortion depends on refusal, unavailability, or inability, to negotiate. But if the object of the extortionate threat can be brought onto the agenda with the other topic, the latent threat becomes effective. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 84

Categorization

• XREF: Directly supports the reader’s thesis: the Mafia attaches its private-enforcement ‘tax’ onto legitimate commercial transactions — the extortionate threat works precisely because it rides the agenda of an ordinary negotiating situation. — connects to: Agenda confinement and publicity neutralize extortionate threats in negotiation — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 85; Extortion succeeds only when bundled onto a legitimate negotiating agenda — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 84
• ADDENDUM: Mirrors how the Godfather’s ‘favours’ are bundled onto weddings, business deals, and funerals — the extortionate or reciprocity-based demand attaches to otherwise legitimate social occasions.

Related

• Extortion succeeds only when bundled onto a legitimate negotiating agenda (similarity 0.92)
• Agenda confinement and publicity neutralize extortionate threats in negotiation (similarity 0.84)

Broader Connections

• Extortion succeeds only when bundled onto a legitimate negotiating agenda #corroborates (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 84
• Agenda confinement and publicity neutralize extortionate threats in negotiation #contradicts (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 85