Without trust the radio dispatch game has no cooperative equilibrium

Evidence

Conversely, if B is unconditionally honest but believes that A is not, his only rational strategy is not to play the game, for he would always lose. What happens to cooperation, however, if he believes that A is dishonest but is himself prepared to be dishonest too? B could wait until A answers the call and then quote a shorter time. But A might think in the same terms and wait for B to reply: neither would ever answer. Waiting, therefore, is not an equilibrium strategy. In theory, a driver could give an answer which is impossible to undercut, in effect quoting a pickup time of zero. This would (almost) invariably be a lie, and no driver would be willing to play the game. In short, without trust there is no cooperative equilibrium. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 594

Categorization

• XREF: Parallels Milgrom’s claim that one-shot games yield cheating as the unique equilibrium; both show why a third-party enforcer or institution is required.
• ADDENDUM: This formal game could support ‘On Sacrifice’ style reasoning about how decentralized cooperative orders need an external stabilizer - though it leans closer to Milgrom.