Voters form settled preferences about reforms only as reform unfolds

Evidence

The constitutional decision is taken behind a veil of ignorance, before the realization of the parameter λi for all i’s and with all individuals facing the same status-quo outcome in case reforms do not occur, an assumption we shall relax below. The preference shock a has to be interpreted as a change of the distribution of preferences occurring after the leader has taken office and while he is implementing his policy. This is meant to capture the idea that as a reform materializes through the effort of a leader new voters come in or the population at large ”matures” definitive preferences about the reform for instance as they learn more precisely who will be a winner or loser form the reform. — Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 43

Categorization

• DEFINE: Explains how the preference shock a is to be interpreted as a post-election shift in the distribution of preferences.
• QUESTION: How would the model change if the status-quo outcome differed across individuals rather than being common to all, as the authors promise to relax below?