Violence gets overproduced by competition even after it is no longer required

Evidence

One way of answering these questions is to invoke an abstract model of the evolution of the protection market. Assume that the business of protection emerged in a brutish world where violence was the routine form of punishment and subjects either lacked the imagination to devise, or proved impervious to, subtler sanctions. Hence, the first “firms” to become established had to prove their efficiency in violence and be properly prepared for it. In the absence of a stable and comprehensive monopoly—including the state—to soften the rules of the game, any new competitor in the market has to select itself on the basis of its predisposition toward toughness before even contemplating entering the fray, for anything less would be suicidal. In this respect, even if violence were no longer strictly required by the business of the guarantor, it would still be overproduced as a consequence of the inertial effects of the competition to which the protection market had been subject since its inception. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 107

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Schelling’s argument that violence is ‘wasted’ as a costly signaling commitment; also parallels the entry-deterrence literature from Milgrom/Roberts that entry into any market demands credible threat power. — connects to: Legalizing demonstrations made claim-making less violent but more frequent — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1326; Violence and antagonism are ineradicable and admit no final political solution — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 605