Vigilante justice enforced elite moral codes rather than neutral popular will
Evidence
Often, it would be wrong to say that the vigilantes were simply filling a legal vacuum. Many vigilantes were fighting against a legal order that was already in place but was simply not to their liking—justice that was not necessarily weak but which (in the eyes of elites) was reaching the wrong results. Dimsdale complains about juries who refused to convict, who showed too much “sympathy” for offenders; he whines about drunkenness, the use of “strong language on every occasion,” about persistent Sabbath-breaking, and the pervasive presence of vice: “women of easy virtue” were seen “promenading” about, catering to the inordinate desire of the miners “for novelty and excitement.” Vigilante justice in Montana was not blind, neutral justice; it was the code of Montana’s elites. It was “popular justice,” in one sense, but deeply antipopular as well. — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2152
Categorization
- XREF: Echoes the class-bias critique of ‘law and order’ that runs through later chapters on morality legislation and the culture-industry material; ties to reader’s LGST thread on law and class. — connects to: Moral authorities justify effective violence despite logical contradictions; Outdated middle-class moral codes become authoritarian when severed from lived conditions — Theodor W. Adorno, The Culture Industry: Selected Essays…, 232; Duty-based moral systems enforce asymmetric, non-proportional exchange favoring the powerful. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 553
Broader Connections
- Outdated middle-class moral codes become authoritarian when severed from lived conditions
#expands(0.75) — Theodor W. Adorno, The Culture Industry, 232 - Moral authorities justify effective violence despite logical contradictions
#corroborates(0.72) - Duty-based moral systems enforce asymmetric, non-proportional exchange favoring the powerful.
#corroborates(0.72) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 553