Valuing a relationship overall does not justify preserving its arbitrary power

Evidence

The error in the above example stems from our confusing the overall evaluation of a whole with an evaluation of its parts considered separately. It is undeniable that, at least in the ordinary course of things, parent-child relationships are extremely valuable, considered as a whole; it does not follow from this, however, that the relationship is necessarily valuable in each and every part. For the objection to hold, it must be the case—not only that the parent-child relationship is valuable overall—but further, that it would actually be worse if, holding all its other features constant, it involved less arbitrary power. But this is highly doubtful. Clearly, the introduction of children’s rights into western law was a boon, precisely because it reduced the degree of arbitrary power to which children are inevitably subject (which is to say, because it increased their republican freedom). — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 37

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies the whole-vs-parts distinction that dissolves the caregiving objection to republican freedom.
• corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 37