Vague legal arrangements can articulate tightly when applied to concrete facts

Evidence

But is it not defensible to conclude that this complex of “loose artificialities” nevertheless articulates tightly when brought to bear upon the concrete facts of an actual situation, leaving only a single question which is fairly open to a reasonable difference of opinion - namely, the question on which the court of appeals changed its mind on rehearing? If you think this is true, consider its implications with respect to the nature of the legal process. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1680

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: A paradigm-flipping claim about how indeterminacy and determinacy coexist in adjudication — the interpretive heart of the book.
• SEED: Angle: legal realism’s indeterminacy thesis tempered by the ‘articulates tightly’ insight — when rules converge on facts.
• recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
• XREF: connects to: Equitable construction can restrain, enlarge, or contradict a statute’s letter — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1903; Required statutory clarity varies with the literacy of its addressees — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3519; Statutory interpretation problems usually involve vagueness, not ambiguity — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 689 (+6 more)

Broader Connections

• Vague legal standards invite courts to beg the question #corroborates (0.80) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 1169
• Statutory interpretation problems usually involve vagueness, not ambiguity #qualifies (0.75) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 689
• The scope and meaning of legal rules depend on factual similarities #expands (0.75) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 151
• Deductive legal analysis applies established characteristic propositions to new cases #expands (0.75) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 680
• Literal application of legal rules sometimes produces absurd against-purpose outcomes #responds-to (0.70) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 284