Required statutory clarity varies with the literacy of its addressees

Evidence

In general, the requisite clearness of statement of a statutory provision should be thought of as varying according to the position of those to whom it is primarily addressed. See pp. 2 9-31, above* Correspondingly, the degreee of clearness which particular words actually have should be judged in the light of tiiat position. This means that attention should be paid not only to the linguistic usages of the addressees as a class but to the extent to which the various elements of the context are known or available to them. E.g., committee reports and legislative debates. … The need for clarity is at its greatestin words addressed to private persons. Words addressed primarily to judges, on the other hand, may fairly presuppose the powers of analysis and ratiocination which judges supposedly have. Words addressed to officials of other kinds may presuppose the characteristic capacity for understanding of those officials. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3519

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Contextual familiarity, not legal training, governs interpretive competence. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 894; Statutory interpretation problems usually involve vagueness, not ambiguity — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 689; Effective legal communication requires balancing clarity against condescension — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law: A Definitive Look at…, 688 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Effective legal communication requires balancing clarity against condescension #complicates (0.85) — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law, 688
• Vague legal arrangements can articulate tightly when applied to concrete facts #complicates (0.80) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1680
• Statutory interpretation problems usually involve vagueness, not ambiguity #expands (0.75) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 689