Utilitarian risk arithmetic justifies sacrificing innocent convicts for public benefit

Evidence

Exonerating comparison relies heavily on moral justification by utilitarian standards. Making violence morally acceptable from a utilitarian perspective is facilitated by two sets of judgments. First, nonviolent options are depicted as ineffective for achieving desired changes, thus removing them from consideration. Second, utilitarian analyses using advantageous comparisons affirm that one’s injurious actions will prevent more human suffering than they cause. The utilitarian cost-benefit calculus, however, can be quite slippery in specific applications. Estimates of future harm contain many uncertainties and ambiguities. Predictive judgment is, therefore, subject to many biases (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). As a result, calculations of long-term human costs and benefits are often suspect. Estimating the gravity of potential threats also is fraught with subjectivity. Moreover, violence is often used as a weapon against minor threats on the grounds that if left unchecked, they will escalate and spread to cause far more human suffering. The frequently invoked domino theory reflects this type of escalative projection error concerning a likely course of events. Estimate of the gravity of a situation justifies choice of options. But preference for violent options often biases estimates of gravity. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 394 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Machine-based risk predictions can cut crime or jail populations dramatically; Statistical risk comparisons can normalize accepting innocent deaths as collateral cost — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 1926; Utilitarian justifications for violence rest on biased estimates of future harm — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 394 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Utilitarian justifications for violence rest on biased estimates of future harm #complicates (0.72) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 394