Statistical risk comparisons can normalize accepting innocent deaths as collateral cost
Evidence
The second part of the comparative defense contrasts the size of the risk of wrongful execution with fatality rates for other activities. Death penalty proponent Wesley Lowe (The death penalty in the United States, 2011) complains that people find the âslim riskâ of wrongful executions âunbearableâ but âaccept the average 45,000 person a year death toll in this nation due to car wrecks.â Continuing with the comparative justification, there is âmuch paranoia on the slimmest and unlikely of risks,â he stated, but tolerance of âmass murders and genocides.â Lowe even cites Joseph Stalin for his âinsight on human nature,â in risk assessment when he said, âOne death is a tragedy, but a million deaths are statistics.â This statistical defense of the death penalty masks the utilitarian morality that it is acceptable to sacrifice a few innocent people for the benefit of many. â Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 1926
Categorization
- QUESTION: Worth researching how risk-comparison rhetoric (car deaths vs wrongful executions) functions across other policy debates.
- CANDY: A death penalty advocate citing Stalinâs âa million deaths are statisticsâ is a compact, conversation-stopping line.
- XREF: connects to: Formalized risk regulation would still fail to register regret over tragic choices â Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: EnvironmentalâŠ, 72; Pricing statistical lives obscures harms that are real only at the collective scale â Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: EnvironmentalâŠ, 301