Uniform preferences can impede reaching the preferred outcome
Evidence
These simulations suggest that when all individuals within a particular environment share the exact same preference for a particular group size, their joint actions may actually impede the formation of groups of the preferred size. In future simulations, it will be of interest to explore what conditions would actually lead to the optimal satisfaction of agents’ group-size preferences. It may be the case that when preferences are distributed more normally, more adaptive patterns of group formation emerge. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 841
Categorization
Category: Contrarian or Surprising Claims
- XREF: Connects to Schelling’s segregation models where uniform tolerance preferences produce more segregated cities than anyone desires. Also Veblen-style emergence failures.
Related
- Uniform individual preferences can impede the very outcomes those people desire. (similarity 0.96)
- Group outcomes emerge from decentralized choices and can disappoint every member’s shared preference. (similarity 0.84)
- Optimal distinctiveness needs drive individuals to join or leave groups by size (similarity 0.79)