Individual preferences for optimal group size can undermine optimal outcomes collectively
Evidence
These results highlight the fact that the creation of optimally distinct groups does not simply happen because each individual group member desires membership in a group of optimal size. As in the real world, these simulations do not involve an omniscient being who has complete knowledge of the environmental space and can assign group memberships in a way that ensures an optimal group size. Instead, individual agents make choices based on the choices of other agents, and the result can sometimes be less than desired, as was the case in the simulations presented here. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 842 (
#corroborates, via linked claim)
Categorization
- corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim
- XREF: connects to: Societal tasks should be handled by the smallest capable group — Laura Albareda and Alejo Jose G. Sison, Commons Organizing: Embedding Common…, 88; Optimal distinctiveness needs drive individuals to join or leave groups by size — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 835; Decentralized choice without global coordination yields suboptimal group outcomes — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 842 (+5 more)
Broader Connections
- Group outcomes emerge from decentralized choices and can disappoint every member’s shared preference.
#corroborates(0.95) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 842