Uncoordinated factory occupations could not escalate into national working-class seizure of power

Evidence

In the northern city of Brescia, one inspector warned state offi cials that arms and bombs were being manufactured in the occupied factories (telegram, September 8, 1920, in Spriano 1975, 78). Th e minister of interior, Enrico Corradini, likewise reported to Giolitti: “It seems the occupiers have machineguns. Th ey claim to have armed a tank, [which was originally] built at Fiat for the state. If this kind of thing goes on, the crisis will become extremely grave” (ACS, Ministero degli Interni 1920, in Spriano 1975, 76). Th e prefect of nearby Milan, Lusignoli, made plain to Corradini that armed forces could only defend a fi ft h of the city in the event of escalation; Lusignoli asked the central government to send a squadron of royal guards, troops, and carabinieri (ACS Ministero degli Interni, Uffi cion Cifra, n. 16, 325, 1920, in Spriano 1975, 179). Here it became increasingly clear to the workers that their permanent selfinstallment as selfgoverning producers rather than wage earners constituted an attack “against the real centers of the capitalist system, i.e., the means of communication, the banks, the armed forces, the state.” … Ultimately, however, diffi culties in achieving national coordination and a common direction paralyzed this moment of insurrection. — Clara E. Mattei, The Capital Order, 561

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Dual power in the factories ended through isolation, not armed force; The state could not suppress the 1920 factory occupations by force — Clara E. Mattei, Escape from Capitalism: An Intervention, 187

Broader Connections

• Dual power in the factories ended through isolation, not armed force #corroborates (0.80)
• The state could not suppress the 1920 factory occupations by force #contradicts (0.80) — Clara E. Mattei, Escape from Capitalism, 187