U.S. political institutions structurally hinder majority-driven policy change.
Evidence
Even in a bivariate, descriptive sense, our evidence indicates that the responsiveness of the U.S. political system when the general public wants government action is severely limited. … Thus when popular majorities favor the status quo, opposing a given policy change, they are likely to get their way; but when a majority—even a very large majority—of the public favors change, it is not likely to get what it wants. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 106
Categorization
- ADDENDUM: Supports themes in ‘On Sacrifice’ indirectly? No — rather it is a systemic mechanism relevant background for the reader’s query distinguishing actual policy influence from rhetorical mobilization by threatened-privilege groups.
- XREF: connects to: U.S. policy responds to elites and interest groups, not the public. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 93; US policymaking institutions are structurally designed to block policy change — Nathan Kelly and Jana Morgan, How US Policymaking Institutions…, 46; U.S. policy outcomes contradict majority preferences whenever elites or organized interests disagree (+8 more)
Broader Connections
- US policymaking institutions are structurally designed to block policy change
#expands(0.96) — Nathan Kelly and Jana Morgan, How US Policymaking Institutions…, 46 - Fragmented U.S. lawmaking institutions structurally favor slow incremental change over sweeping reform
#expands(0.95) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 170 - Consensus-based institutions let a minority block majority-supported policy.
#expands(0.88) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 2595 - Majority support for policy change usually fails to produce reform.
#exemplifies(0.86) — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor, 54 - U.S. policy outcomes contradict majority preferences whenever elites or organized interests disagree
#expands(0.85) - Majority-supported U.S. policies pass only rarely, making countermajoritarian entrenchment tests unusable
#corroborates(0.85) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 421 - Veto players are institutions with power to block policy change
#expands(0.84) — Nathan Kelly and Jana Morgan, How US Policymaking Institutions…, 65 - US institutions are biased toward stasis that protects existing hierarchies
#expands(0.82) — Nathan Kelly and Jana Morgan, How US Policymaking Institutions…, 21 - Blocking demands less coordination than achieving political change
#expands(0.78) — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor, 39 - Repoliticization has not translated into popular policy control
#exemplifies(0.74) — Anton Jäger, Hyperpolitics, 26