Trust operations depend on interpreting signals, not on others’ actual truthfulness

Evidence

But there is another important class of cases where trust, in the sense that I wish to use the term, comes into play. This is when others know something about themselves or the world which I do not, and when - what I ought to do depends on the extent of my ignorance of these matters. An agreement between myself and such other people may call upon them to disclose their information. But can I trust them to be truthful; that is, can I trust them to send me the correct signals, those they would send if they were truly trustworthy? (They do not actually have to be truthful for me to rely on them. As long as I always know how to interpret their messages correctly I can trust them. Thus the ancient Cretan was as informative as a knowledgeable saint.) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 795

Categorization

Category: Definitional Content

  • DEFINE: Sharpens the definition of trust: it is about correct signal interpretation, not truthful disposition — a legible reading matters more than honesty.
  • XREF: Connects to the sighted wife’s legibility problem in Blindness: the blind can trust her only if her signals remain interpretable; and to Luhmann’s ‘familiarity’ as the substrate for legible signals.