Trust in signal-disclosure cases hinges on interpretability, not truthfulness

Evidence

But there is another important class of cases where trust, in the sense that I wish to use the term, comes into play. This is when others know something about themselves or the world which I do not, and when - what I ought to do depends on the extent of my ignorance of these matters. An agreement between myself and such other people may call upon them to disclose their information. But can I trust them to be truthful; that is, can I trust them to send me the correct signals, those they would send if they were truly trustworthy? (They do not actually have to be truthful for me to rely on them. As long as I always know how to interpret their messages correctly I can trust them. Thus the ancient Cretan was as informative as a knowledgeable saint.) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 795

Categorization

• DEFINE: Useful definitional distinction: trust in actions versus trust in disclosed information/messages.
• XREF: Connects to Saramago’s blindness where signals collapse - the wife must interpret unreliable signals from the blind. — connects to: Uncommitted hearings function as interest-alignment signaling rather than evidence evaluation — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 648; Status appraisal works by triangulating a whole package of signals against hard-to-fake cues — W. David Marx, Status and Culture: How Our Desire for…, 236