Treaty most-favored clauses can strengthen a weaker ally’s bargaining position.

Evidence

A similar principle is reflected in Article 26 of the Japanese peace treaty, which gives the United States certain claims if subsequent Japanese territorial concessions to other powers are more favorable. When the Japanese were reported to be under pressure from the Russians for additional territorial concessions in 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles pointedly described that article of the treaty in his press conference and said that he had recently “reminded the Japanese of the existence of that clause.” — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 360

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘if I did it for you, I’d have to do it for everyone else’ bargaining claim parallels reciprocity enforcement mechanisms. — connects to: In bargaining, seeming weakness can convert into strategic strength. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 130