Tort reform both defunded Democrats and mobilized Republican funders.

Evidence

Here again, the same policy that neutralizes political opposition can also mobilize political support. Tort reform seems to have played this dual role for the Republicans in the 1990s and 2000s: not only did it impede the ability of trial lawyers to finance Democratic candidates, it also protected Republican business constituencies from high-dollar tort judgments and thus incentivized (and better enabled) this constituency to act as funders for the Republican Party. As John Podesta, White House Chief of Staff under Bill Clinton, told the Washington Post: “Why would you make [tort reform] the cause célèbre? … It’s important to them in both directions, both in organizing core elements of their business and doctor communities, and at least undermining a financial base of the Democratic Party.” — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 276

Categorization

• XREF: Same dual role as neutralizing opponents and mobilizing supporters noted in ch5 — here applied to tort reform specifically. — connects to: Neutralizing opponents and mobilizing supporters are interchangeable entrenchment tactics — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 247; Partisan defunding incentives partly drove Republican adoption of tort reform — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 263; Tort reform targeted trial lawyers because they financed the Democratic Party. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 269