Three presumptions govern how courts attribute purpose to statutes.

Evidence

Deciding what purpose ought to be attributed to a tatute 1 often difficult. But Lt least three things abou it are always AAZ .(a) The statute ought always to be presumed to be the work of reasonable men pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably, unless the contrary is made unmistakably to appear. (b) The general words of a statute ought never to be read as directing an irrational pattern of particular applications. (c) What constitutes an irrational pattern of particular applications ought alwsys to be judged in the light of the overriding and organizing purpose. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 884

Categorization

• DEFINE: Sets out a reusable test for purpose-attribution - reasonable legislators, no irrational application patterns, purpose governs what counts as irrational.
• ADDENDUM: Supports ‘Grafting & Growth’ analogously - purpose as the organizing root from which specific applications branch, and ‘Complaints About Immodesty’ on how general norms get read against context.
• recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
• XREF: connects to: No statute can be interpreted without attributing purpose to it. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 880; Courts should attribute purpose to statutes and interpret words to serve it — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3499; Courts can include new subjects under old statutes despite absent legislative intent — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1406 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Courts should attribute purpose to statutes and interpret words to serve it #expands (0.85) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3499
• Courts decide statutory meaning where legislative intent is genuinely ambiguous #qualifies (0.75) — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 490
• Courts can include new subjects under old statutes despite absent legislative intent #qualifies (0.72) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1406