Three of four trust theories require cognitive assessment of the trusted

Evidence

In the academic literature, there are four main theories or models of trust that are actually brought to bear in empirical claims and research. Three of these are based on the kinds of reasons for judging the trustworthiness of the potentially trusted, and we could as sensibly say that these are three different theories of trustworthiness as that they are theories of trust. These kinds of reasons are encapsulated interest, moral commitment, and commitment from character. Two of these—moral commitment and character—are dispositional reasons, and the other—encapsulated interest—is a reason from interests. The fundamentally important common feature of these three theories or models of trust is that they require cognitive assessments of the trustworthiness of the potentially trusted. The fourth theory is purely dispositional trust that is not grounded in the assessment of the trustworthiness of the trusted and therefore is not at all a theory of trustworthiness. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 872

Categorization

• DEFINE: Hardin’s taxonomy of trust theories: encapsulated interest, moral commitment, character commitment, and purely dispositional trust — the first three are cognitive, the fourth isn’t.
• XREF: The doctor’s wife in Saramago cannot cognitively assess the blind others’ trustworthiness since blindness has destroyed observable constraints — connecting this taxonomy to the analytical integration.