Theorizing power requires borrowing general concepts from other domains rather than defining it directly

Evidence

There have been numerous and conflicting attempts to conceptualize the phenomenon of power in a way which is both theoretically and empirically satisfactory. Faced with this situation, a theory of power cannot content itself with a descriptive statement, with an analysis of its essence, which virtually incorporates by way of assumptions the results it elicits. Even attempts to analyse the concept on its own, and to divide the term into its different meanings, take us no further – unless towards wariness and, in the end, resignation. In such circumstances it is not possible to proceed step by step and thereby presuppose what power is. Instead, we must try to use more general concepts, which are in use elsewhere and which might serve the transfer of already established questions, and conceptual frameworks, which facilitate comparison and offer the possibility of relevant examination of other areas of interest. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 580

Categorization

• XREF: Luhmann’s strategy of importing general systems-theoretic concepts mirrors how he’ll analyze trust (itself a complexity-reduction mechanism) via the same general framework — relevant to the reader’s thesis linking trust and power as parallel social mechanisms.