The united front from below contradicted the tactic’s premise of winning the working-class majority

Evidence

This eminently dialectical tactic required an unremitting struggle against left and right deviations in the interpretation of it, and ultimately broke down in the “right” and “left” zigzags of 1927-8 and 1929-34. On the one hand, a number of parties, among them the P.C.I., had the greatest reluctance in accepting the hated centrists as in any sense potential allies — even if the object was partly to discredit them. They rejected the idea that it was necessary to win the majority of the working class. … The most that the Italian communists — and here Gramsci or Togliatti did not differ from Bordiga — were prepared to accept was what they termed the united front “from below”; but clearly this was tantamount to a rejection of the tactic, since the only reason for it at all was the impossibility as yet of establishing direct contact with the majority of the working class or of by-passing their reformist or centrist leaders. — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 117

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The Comintern’s united front aimed to win a working-class majority — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 115; The united front ‘from below’ effectively rejected the Comintern tactic; The united front tactic presumed gaining majority working-class support precedes revolution — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 116 (+4 more)
• yield-rescued: below the book’s yield-target cutoff, included anyway for connecting to: The Comintern’s united front aimed to win a working-class majority — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 115; The united front ‘from below’ effectively rejected the Comintern tactic; The united front tactic presumed gaining majority working-class support precedes revolution — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 116 (+4 more)