The Supreme Court overruled Congress’s judgment about which ecological injuries count

Evidence

In enacting the Endangered Species Act, however, Congress was not simply responding to the narrow category of concerns represented by those very few individuals who might have actual, immediate plans to interact with the threatened species in its habitat. Congress instead was responding to the broader category of persons who care deeply about the survival of those species for any of a number of reasons, ranging from scientific interest to deeply held views about the responsibilities of humankind to other species. Such a concrete, individualized concern need not be based on the party’s having the personal resources necessary for actual travel and some sort of a physical communing with the species. The Supreme Court, however, effectively ruled that such a legislative judgment was constitutionally out of bounds, at least for the purpose of establishing that an individual possesses the kind of personal injury necessary to maintain a lawsuit. — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 599

Categorization

• XREF: Care-about-things-you-can’t-touch evokes ch9’s emotional-ecological ties thread and LGST questions about what counts as a judicially cognizable injury. — connects to: 1990s Supreme Court decisions systematically raised barriers to citizen environmental standing — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 596; Congressional inaction following judicial construction can count as adoption of that construction — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3273
• QUESTION: Standing doctrine assumes injury requires physical proximity — worth chasing whether ‘psychological injury’ theories ever regained traction later.

Broader Connections

• 1990s Supreme Court decisions systematically raised barriers to citizen environmental standing #corroborates (0.82) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 596
• Congressional inaction following judicial construction can count as adoption of that construction #qualifies (0.72) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3273